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Highlights 
 Chinese firms’ leverage ratios decrease when the economic policy uncertainty increases. 
 This effect is heterogeneous across firms in terms of regional marketization, ownership 
and bank-firm relationship.  
 This effect is sourced from the deterioration of the external financing environment 
imposed by economic policy uncertainty 
 Firms adjust their financing structures by using more trade credit when economic policy 
uncertainty increases. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Due to the nature of policy decision-making and implementation processes, economic 
policies typically generate a large amount of uncertainty, which can impose profound impacts 
on the financial market and firm behaviour. Using alternative policy uncertainty measures, 
previous literature has explored the association between economic policy uncertainty and 
asset prices (Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; Brogaard and Detzel, 2012), corporate investment 
decisions (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2013) and IPO activities (Colak et al., 
2013). However, our understanding towards the effect of economic policy uncertainty on 
firms’ capital structure choices, a core research question in corporate finance, is still limited. 
Meanwhile, prior research in this area has rarely paid attention to emerging or transition 
economies, where the financial markets tend to be highly regulated and prone to being 
influenced by government policy (Erb et al. 1996). 
 
As an attempt to fill this void, we propose the current study to empirically examine how 
economic policy uncertainty affects firms’ capital structure decisions in China — a typical 
emerging financial market. We find strong evidence that Chinese firms’ leverage ratios are 
negatively related to economic policy uncertainty, and that this effect is more pronounced for 
firms that are in regions with higher degrees of marketization, are non-state owned or have no 
prior bank-firm relationship. We also identify the underlying mechanism of this effect as the 
deterioration of the external financing environment caused by policy uncertainty. 
 
The idea that economic policy uncertainty may affect firms’ capital structures is not new. 
Indeed there are two alternative channels that are categorized by this study as the supply 
effect and demand effect. The main idea of the supply effect is that uncertainty in economic 
policies will deteriorate the external financing environment. When economic policy 
uncertainty increases, the information asymmetry between borrowers and creditors would 
become more severe and, at the same time, firms’ future cash flows would be more volatile 
— indicating higher default risk. Both of these effects can lead to higher external financing 
costs, with firms generally lowering their leverage ratios in seeking financial flexibility. In 
support of this idea, recent empirical studies on the U.S. financial market document that 
economic policy uncertainty increases the risk premium of municipal bonds (Gao and Qi, 
2012), reduces the average leverage ratio of listed firms (Cao et al., 2013), and imposes 
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additional costs and more stringent non-price terms on bank loan contracts at both aggregate 
and firm level (Francis et al., 2013). On the other hand, the demand effect refers to the 
scenario whereby firms reduce their financing demand in face of increasing policy 
uncertainty. Prior research documents that when firms face high political uncertainty, they 
will be more conservative in making investment decisions (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom et al., 
2007) and lower their investment level (Kang et al., 2014; Gulen and Ion, 2013; Wang et al., 
2014). In summary, both channels assert a negative relationship between economic policy 
uncertainty and firms’ capital structures; however, it is difficult to identify the dominating 
effect. 
 
We choose Chinese listed firms as the experiment sample due to three considerations. First, 
as stated above, the limited research on this topic mainly focuses on the U.S. market, 
therefore our study in China can provide an “out-of-sample” test for the existing empirical 
results in a market with distinct institutional features which play key roles in affecting 
corporate capital decisions1. It is thus important to test whether the documented relationship 
between policy uncertainty and capital structure decisions holds in this market. Second, the 
regional divergences in institutional environment and firm heterogeneities, in terms of 
ownership structure and bank-firm relationships, are more typical in the Chinese financial 
market (Fan et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2009). These characteristics generate significant cross-
sectional variations, which can deepen our understanding about the possible asymmetry of 
the policy uncertainty effect. Third, China is still regarded as a transition economy moving 
from a planned towards a market-based economy. The primary source of financing in this 
market is bank loans (Allen, et al., 2005; Ayyagari, et al., 2010); with the bank loan 
environment extremely sensitive to variations in government policies2. Thus, this provides us 
with an ideal experimental setting to identify the possible roles and channels through which 
economic policy uncertainty affects firms’ capital structure decisions. 
                                                            
1
 Though the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange ranked as sixth and eleventh in the 
world in terms of market capitalization at the end of June 2012, and China’s capital market transitions to a more 
mature market through a process of financial reform and modernization, there are still distinct institutional 
features that could potentially affect corporate capital structure decisions. The most important  features include: 
the dominating role of state ownership in  the Chinese capital market ; Chinese the imposing explicit or implicit 
control of the volume and price of equity issuance; and banking is the primary source of financing. For more 
detailed discussions towards these features, we refer readers to Change et al., 2014. 
2
 One recent example is that, in 2009, the Chinese central government proposed a stimulus plan amounting to 4 
trillion Yuan, and to fund these investments, the government required banks to increase the supply of loans 
dramatically. As a result, the Chinese market experienced a jump of bank loans from 4.9 trillion Yuan in 2008 to 
9.59 trillion Yuan in 2009. 
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To measure economic policy uncertainty in China, we resort to Baker et al. (2013), in which 
they construct a scaled frequency count of articles about policy-related economic uncertainty 
in the South China Morning Post (SCMP) — Hong Kong's Leading English-language 
newspaper3. This economic policy uncertainty index for China (EPU hereinafter) follows the 
similar logic and methodology of the news-based index for the United States, which has a 
wide range of applications4. In a recent study, Wang et al. (2014) adopt the EPU index to 
investigate the influence of economic policy uncertainty on corporate investment in China. 
 
Figure 1 plots the time series behaviour of monthly EPU from January, 1995 to December, 
2013, as well as the quarterly GDP growth rate from Quarter 1, 1995 to Quarter 4, 2013. The 
left Y-axis represents EPU and the right Y-axis represents GDP growth rate as a percentage.  
It is evident that the movement of EPU is volatile across time, which can help us better 
identify the effect of EPU on capital structures. An interesting observation from the figure is 
that EPU tends to bump when the GDP growth rate continuously declines, suggesting that the 
pressure of the economy declining tends to push the government to adjust current policies. 
There are three peaks of EPU over the whole sample, i.e. at October 2001, September 2008 
and November 2011, and the EPU remains at high ranges around these three peaks as well. 
One main factor that contributes to the 2001 peak is China’s entry into the WTO, which 
generated a large amount of uncertainty as the economic policies needed to adjust to meet the 
requirements of marketization. From 2008 to 2009, in face of the global financial crisis, the 
Chinese government issued a series of macroeconomic policies to stimulate the economy.  
For the most recent peak, three factors contributed to the jump of uncertainty, including the 
Eurozone crisis, the government’s stimulus policies in the presence of declining economic 
growth, and the election in 2012.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 
                                                            
3
 South China Morning Post (SCMP) is the first (founded in 1903) and largest English-language Hong Kong 
newspaper published by the SCMP Group, with a circulation of 104,000. Its contents cover the news regarding 
Hong Kong, mainland China and Asia. 
4
 For instance, Pastor and Veronesi (2013) use the EPU index for US to study the risk premia of political 
uncertainty in the financial market; Kang et al. (2014) relies on this index to examine the effect of political 
uncertainty on firm-level investment in U.S.; Colombo (2013) explores the impact of the U.S. EPU index on 
Eurozone macroeconomic aggregates. 
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We apply the EPU index with a panel data set of listed Chinese firms from Quarter 1, 2003 to 
Quarter 4, 2013 in the empirical analysis. The estimation results show that when the lagged 
economic policy uncertainty increases, firm-level leverage ratios decrease on average. 
Moreover, we split the total leverage ratio into short-term leverage and long-term leverage 
ratios, and our results show that economic policy uncertainty is negatively associated with 
both leverage measures.  
 
We then make two extensions to the baseline regression model. In the first extension, we find 
that firms from the higher marketized regions have greater leverage-uncertainty sensitivity. 
This result is consistent with the fact that, in China, bank lending decisions often experience 
intervention by local governments, especially in less marketized regions. In the second 
extension, we incorporate two featured firm heterogeneities, ownership and bank-firm 
relationship, into the regression analysis. The results show that firms owned by the state or 
those with a prior bank-firm relationship are better positioned to attenuate the negative 
impact of economic policy uncertainty on capital structures. These results are in accordance 
with the findings in the U.S. market, which indicate that firms with easier access to public 
debt markets are less sensitive to policy uncertainty (e.g., Cao et al., 2013) and provide 
preliminarily evidence for the supply effect. 
 
To further identify the underlying mechanism of the documented relationship between 
economic policy uncertainty and capital structures, we first control for the effect of 
investment changes. Specifically, we split our sample based on the absolute adjacent change 
rate of investment (0%-25%, 25%-50% and 50%-100%), and estimate our empirical model in 
each of these three sub-samples, respectively. The results show that the negative effect of 
policy uncertainty holds across all of these sub-samples in a similar qualitative and 
quantitative manner. We further explore the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the 
supply of loans at the provincial level, and find that the increase in policy uncertainty leads to 
a significant decrease in the supply of loans. Consistent with the evidence on loan supply, we 
also find a strong positive relationship between the cost of debt and EPU. All the above 
results suggest that the supply effect is the dominating effect that shapes the role of economic 
policy uncertainty. 
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Finally, we study the impact of EPU on the usage of trade credit. Since the financial 
development level in China is still low, commercial bank loans cannot satisfy firms’ overall 
financing demands. Therefore, the supporting effects from trade credit may exceed that of 
commercial bank loans, especially for non-state firms (Allen et al., 2005; Ayyagari et al., 
2010). In this sense, ceteris paribus, it is possible that firms would switch from bank loans to 
trade credit to meet their financing demands. This conjecture is confirmed by our empirical 
results that show that the measures for trading credit are positively related to EPU. 
 
As aforementioned, concurrent studies on the U.S. market, particularly Cao et al. (2013), 
draw the similar conclusion that economic policy uncertainty and capital structures is 
negatively related. Given our sample firms are from a typical emerging market, our results 
complement those of the U.S. market. Further, our study is distinct from other studies in three 
significant ways. First, we take into account firm heterogeneities, including regional 
differences in marketization, ownership structures and bank-firm relationships, which are 
unique features of the Chinese financial market. Second, we find robust evidence that the 
effect of EPU is mainly sourced from the “supply effect”, rather than the “demand effect”. 
Third, our study is the first study that examines the relationship between EPU and the usage 
of trade credits. We conclude that firms tend to switch from bank loans (formal finance) to 
trade credits (informal finance) in the presence of increasing policy uncertainty. 
 
2. Sample selection and variable definition 
 
2.1. Sample data 
 
We use a sample of Chinese listed companies' quarterly financial statement data to examine 
the effect of economic policy uncertainty on corporate financing decisions. We also use 
quarterly data to explore more time-series variations following Leary and Roberts (2005). 
Since all publicly listed companies have been required by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) to publish quarterly financial reports since 2003, our sample period 
starts from the first quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2013.  Based on previous studies 
on capital structure, we exclude 43 financial firms which are specially regulated and usually 
have extremely high leverage ratios.  53 “ST” (special treatment) or “PT” (particular transfer) 
firms which are particularly monitored due to their poor operating performances have also 
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been excluded5. After the above filtering procedure, our final sample contains 2,038 public 
firms listed as A-shares. We obtain the accounting data from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) created by the Guotai’an Information Technology 
Company (GTA) and the data regarding firm ownership is sourced from the Chinese Center 
for Economic Studies (CCER) Finance Database. In addition, we use macroeconomic data, 
including the amount of loans, investments and deposit amounts at the provincial level for 31 
provinces, as well as the GDP growth rates, loan interest rates and deposit reserve rates at the 
national level, from the CEIC China Database. Finally, we use the EPU index from Baker et 
al. (2013)6. 
 
2.2. Empirical model and variable definitions 
 
We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on capital structures using the 
following baseline empirical model: 
 
, 1 1 , 1 ,0 ,      1i t t i t i i tLeverage EPU X Leverage Quarter Industryα β γ λ ε− −= + + + + + +∑ ∑ （ ） 
where Leverage is the book leverage ratio, defined as total debt scaled by total assets7. We 
exclude the market leverage ratio in the current study due to the fact that before 2007, a large 
fraction of the shares of Chinese listed firms were non-tradable. Therefore, the market value 
of the firm is hard to measure accurately and difficult to compare between the pre-2007 and 
post-2007 periods. 
 
                                                            
5
 Aiming at enhancing corporate governance and protecting investors' interests, the CSRC introduced a 
particular delisting mechanism in 1998. Under this mechanism, a firm that has negative profits for two 
consecutive years will be designated a “ST” firm. If a “ST” firm continues to generate a loss for one more year, 
then it will be designated a “PT” firm and will be delisted if it cannot turn a profit within another one year. The 
shares of ST firms are traded with a 5% price change limit every day while the limit for normal firms’ shares is 
10%. Besides this, their semi-annual financial reports must be audited. The shares of PT firms can only be 
traded on Friday, with a maximum 5% upside limit to last Friday's closing price, but there is no limit on the 
downside (Bai, Liu, and Song, 2002). 
6
 Available at www.policyuncertainty.com. 
7
 The total debt in the Chinese context is primarily bank loans. Here, we have not included the accounts 
payables in calculating the total debt due to the consideration that policy uncertainty might impact the accounts 
payable (trade credit) differently from that of the bank loans. Thus, we study this particular effect separately in 
the later empirical analysis. 
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EPU represents one-quarter lagged economic policy uncertainty. Since the index of Baker et 
al. (2013) is monthly based, we adjust it to a quarterly observation following Gulen and Ion 
(2013), such that: EPUt=(3EPUm+2EPUm-1+EPUm-2)/6. 
 
To scale it, we divide it by 100. X represents a set of one-quarter lagged control variables. 
Specifically, we include firm size, profitability, sales growth rate (∆Sales) and tangibility. We 
do not include Tobin’s Q to capture growth opportunity, as in Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Huang and Song (2006) among others, due to the non-tradable shares issue mentioned above. 
Instead, we use the sales growth rate as a proxy following Petersen and Rajan (1997) and 
Love et al. (2007). 
 
Leveragei,0 defines firm i’s initial leverage ratio. Lemmon et al. (2008) show that the 
variation in capital structures is primarily determined by factors which remain stable for long 
periods of time. Zhou and Xu (2012) also find that the initial leverage ratio relates positively 
to the future leverage ratio for Chinese firms. In this spirit, we include the initial leverage 
ratio as an additional control variable. 
 
In the empirical model, we also include the quarter fixed effect and industry fixed effect to 
control for overall macroeconomic factors over time, seasonality in corporate financing 
decisions, and industry characteristics. Industry is defined based on the 22 industries 
classified by the CSRC. 
 
To measure the impact of the institutional environment and firm heterogeneities on the 
sensitivity of leverage to EPU, we include the interaction terms of the marketization index, 
ownership and bank-firm relationship with EPU in the expanded models. We derive the 
marketization index for 31 provinces from Fan et al. (2011), who construct this index based 
on the degree of economic development, legal system and government intervention8 . A 
higher score of the marketization index suggests better institutional development. Ownership 
is a categorical variable coded as 1 when the ultimate owner of the firm is the government or 
the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, and is 0 otherwise. We 
                                                            
8
 This marketization index is compiled by the National Economic Research Institute of China. This index 
intends to capture the regional market development (including relationship between government and markets, 
development of non-state-owned sector in the economy, development of product markets, development of factor 
markets, and development of market intermediaries and legal environment (Wang et al., 2014). 
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define the bank-firm relationship based on whether the firm has a long-term loan contract 
with the bank, following Houston and James (1996) and Hao et al. (2013). Specifically, the 
bank-firm relationship is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the firm has a long-term loan 
contract in the prior year, and is 0 otherwise. We hand-collect this information from the 
appendences of the annual financial reports released on the Shenzhen Securities Information 
Company website from 2003 to 20119. We exclude the loans from the three policy banks: the 
China Development Bank, The Export-Import Bank of China and the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China. 
 
All the financial ratio variables are adjusted by the inflation rate and winsorized at the 0.5% 
and 99.5% levels. We refer readers to Appendix 1 for detailed definitions of each of the 
variables used in this paper. 
 
2.3. Summary statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables at the firm-quarter level used in 
our empirical analysis. It can be seen that the quarterly EPU has a mean of 1.280, with the 
25% quantile at 0.752 and the 75% quantile at 1.634 — suggesting that the variation of policy 
uncertainty is not smooth. The quarterly Leverage is 52.2% on average, but can be as low as 
3.50% and as high as 2.877 as well. It is also interesting to find that the Initial leverage 
shares a similar distribution with Leverage. The Ownership dummy has a mean of 0.387, 
implying that more firms are non-state owned in our sample. Meanwhile, the average 
percentage of firms that have a prior relationship with bank is 59.80%. The marketization 
index has a mean of 10.511 and standard deviation of 2.657. The maximum is 15.244, while 
the minimum is 0.730, indicating that the divergence of institutional development across 
different regions is considerable. 
 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
                                                            
9
 Found at www.cninfo.com.cn. 
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3.1. Baseline regression results 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of our baseline empirical models from Quarter 1, 2003 
to Quarter 4, 2013. In the first column, we estimate the model using total Leverage as the 
dependent variable. The main explanatory variable of interest, namely the lagged EPU, is 
found to be negatively associated with Leverage at the 1% significance level. This finding is 
consistent with our main hypothesis that EPU can lead firms to decrease their debt financing 
due to the demand or supply effect.  
 
For the control variables, profitability is negatively correlated with the leverage ratio, and this 
finding is consistent with the pecking order theory and existing capital structure studies about 
China. In accordance with the trade-off theory, Size relates positively with leverage as the 
bankruptcy probability of large firms is low. Using the same measure for size, Bhabra et al. 
(2008) and Zou and Xiao (2006) have also drawn the same conclusion. Tangibility is found to 
be positively associated with leverage, and is thus consistent with the prediction of the trade-
off theory, as firms with higher tangible assets are prone to have lower distress costs and 
fewer agency problems. ∆Sales, as a proxy for growth opportunity, is positively correlated 
with the leverage ratio. Though this is contrary to the predictions of the trade-off theory, this 
result is consistent with the feature of Chinese financial markets, in which firms with 
considerable growth opportunity rely primarily on bank loans to finance their projects (due to 
strict restrictions on equity issuance)10. Notably, the Initial leverage is positively associated 
with the leverage ratio, confirming the role of initial leverage in shaping the capital structure, 
as addressed by Lemmon et al. (2008). 
 
In the second and third columns, we replace total Leverage with long-term leverage and 
short-term leverage, respectively. The results show that EPU relates negatively to both 
measures of leverage, while the magnitude is more promising for the short-term measure. 
Collectively, the baseline regression estimates provide strong evidence that economic policy 
uncertainty has a negative relationship with firms' future capital structures. 
 
                                                            
10
 Empirically, in existing capital structure research on China, the conclusions depend on the choice of proxy for 
growth opportunity. When Tobin's Q is used as the proxy, the coefficients generally become negative (Huang 
and Song, 2006; Bhabra et al., 2008). 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
3.2. Impact of regional divergence of marketization 
 
A typical phenomenon in China is that the degree of institutional development is uneven 
across regions and provinces (Fan et al., 2011). In addition, the performance assessment of 
local government officials mainly focuses on the performance of local firms. So it is common 
that local governments tend to intervene to claim more bank loans for their local firms, 
especially in the areas with low degrees of marketization. Therefore, the financing contract 
relation based on profit maximization between firms and banks is destroyed. As a result, the 
borrowing decision of banks would become less sensitive to the overall market condition in 
regions with lower degrees of marketization (Fang, 2007). In the spirit of this reasoning, we 
thus hypothesise that the impact of EPU on capital structures will be less significant for firms 
that are negatively associated with the degree of marketization.  
 
To test this conjecture, we first split our sample into a high marketization sub-sample and a 
low marketization sub-sample based on the median of the marketization index of Fan et al. 
(2011), and run the baseline regressions in both sub-samples. The results, reported in the first 
two columns in Table 3, show that the corporate leverage ratio for firms in the high and low 
marketization groups exhibit no significant difference and the coefficients on EPU are still 
significant and negative. Considering that the sample splitting, based upon the simple median 
value of marketization, may not reveal much information, in the third column we create three 
marketization dummy variables based upon the 25, 50, and 75 quantiles of the index, and 
interact them with the EPU variable. Results in the third column show a significant pattern 
indicating that firms from lower marketized provinces are less sensitive to EPU, as the 
coefficients of the interaction dummies, which are all positive, are relatively larger for lower 
quintile dummies (0.023, 0.017 and 0.002, respectively). This finding thus confirms our 
conjecture that government intervention would mitigate the impact of economic policy 
uncertainty, and is also consistent with the result of Wang et al. (2014), who document that 
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the corporate investment of Chinese firms in higher marketized regions are more sensitive to 
policy uncertainty11. 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
 
3.3. Impact of ownership and bank-firm relationship 
 
The financial system in China remains under the control of the government to a large extent, 
even though there have been major economic and political reforms in recent decades. One 
typical feature of this system is that most commercial banks are owned by the government, 
while the government also holds majority ownership of the state firms. This political 
connection ensures that state firms tend to have a priority for loans from the commercial 
banks12. Meanwhile, banks maintain a lower sensitivity of loan issuance to default risk for 
state firms according to Hao et al. (2013). Therefore, it is natural to predict that the impact of 
economic policy uncertainty will be mitigated for firms that are stated owned. However, on 
the other hand, the exposure of firms with different ownership structures to policy uncertainty 
risk may also be different; as state owned firms are more politically connected, they are 
assumed to bear more political risk. As a result, the impact of EPU on capital structures may 
be more pronounced for state owned firms. For instance, Cao et al. (2013) find that in the 
U.S., firms that have less policy risk exposure are less sensitive to the economic policy 
uncertainty index. 
 
To empirically identify the impact of ownership, we interact the Ownership variable with 
EPU in the baseline regression model. From the first column of Table 4, we find that the 
coefficient on EPU is still significantly negative, while the interaction terms between EPU 
and Ownership is significant and positive, suggesting that the negative effect of EPU on 
capital structure is attenuated for firms that are stated owned.  
                                                            
11
 Therefore, another possible explanation of our results is that the less sensitivity of capital structure to EPU in 
less marketized regions sources from the investment channel, i.e. the demand effect. We leave this question for 
further analysis in the Section 3.4. 
12
 There are various reasons for this kind of preference including political interest, information cost and 
government guarantee among others (Brandt and Li, 2003). 
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Besides the ownership structure, we also examine the impact of the bank-firm relationship. If 
policy uncertainty affects capital structures through the supply effect, i.e. decreasing loan 
supply and rising financing cost, it is natural to predict that this effect will be weaker for 
firms maintaining a relationship with banks — possibly due to less severe information 
asymmetry. Following Houston and James (1996) and Hao et al. (2013), we define the bank-
firm relationship as being whether a firm has a long-term loan contract in the prior year. We 
then augment the baseline model by interacting the bank-firm relation variable with EPU. 
The estimation result reported in the second column of Table 4 shows that the bank-firm 
relationship indeed mitigates the negative effect of EPU significantly.  
 
Overall, in this section, we find that the impact of policy uncertainty on firms with different 
financing capabilities and constraints are not symmetric. Our findings are also consistent with 
studies in U.S., which document that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on firm 
financing decisions is less significant for firms with public debt access13.  
 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
3.4. Further interpretations 
 
All the results above provide strong evidence that uncertainty in economic policy does have a 
negative impact on firms’ capital structure decisions in China. In this section, we conduct 
three experiments to help identify the possible channels supporting the effect of EPU. 
 
 
3.4.1. Controlling for investment change 
 
It is widely documented by previous studies that policy uncertainty is negatively associated 
with corporate investment levels due to increasing discount rates (see, for e.g., Gulen and Ion, 
                                                            
13
 However, though the results are consistent with the supply effect hypothesis, we cannot rule out the demand 
effect. 
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2013; Kang et al., 2014; and Wang et al., 2014). Therefore, it is possible that the significant 
sensitivity of capital structure towards policy uncertainty is driven by decreasing financing 
needs (demand effect) rather than the direct impact on the financing environment (supply 
effect). As a response, in this section, we first control for the change of investment in our 
empirical analysis. Specifically, we create three dummy variables based upon the 25, 50, and 
75 quantiles of the absolute rate of investment ratio change (Cap.exp14), and interact them 
with the EPU variable. If the decreasing investment caused by EPU contributes as the 
primary reason for capital structure choice, we would see that the sensitivity of capital 
structure to EPU is less significant for observations with smaller variations in investments. 
However, the empirical results reported in Table 5 show that the coefficients before the 
interaction terms of EPU and the dummy variables are insignificant. This finding, though 
preliminary, provides some evidence that the demand effect may not be the dominating effect 
shaping the role of EPU on firms' capital structure choices. This thus inspires us to explore 
the supply effect in the following context. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
3.4.2. Impact of EPU on loan supply and cost of debt 
 
In this section, we examine two possibly related channels through which economic policy 
uncertainty may affect firms’ external financing environment — namely, the supply of bank 
loans and cost of debt. This experiment will provide us with a general picture regarding 
whether economic political uncertainty generates financial frictions for Chinese firms.  
 
We first examine the relationship between the change of EPU and the loan supply at the 
provincial level with the following model from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013: 
 
1 1 2 , 3 , 1 4 1
5 1 6 , 1 ,
i,
                    
 ∆
 2
∆ ∆t t i t i t t
t i t i t
Loan EPU Investment Deposit IR
DRR GDP Quarter Province
α β β β β
β β ε
− − −
− −
= + + + +
+ + + + +∑ ∑ （ ）
 
 
                                                            
14
 Cap.ex (investment) is defined as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets in the last period. Capital 
expenditure is measured as the sum of cash paid for the acquisition of fixed assets, intangible assets and other 
long-term assets. 
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where ∆Loani,t is the growth rate of loans in province i, which is used as a proxy for loan 
supply15; ∆EPU is the change rate of the EPU index; ∆Investmenti is the investment growth 
rate in province i; ∆Depositi is the growth rate of deposits in province i; ∆IR is the growth 
rate of the national loan interest rate; ∆DRR is the growth rate of the deposit reserve rate; and 
GDPi is the GDP growth rate in province i. All the control variables are one quarter lagged. 
We also include the quarter fixed effects alone or together with the province fixed effects. 
 
From the estimation results reported in Panel A of Table 6, we can see that when the change 
rate of EPU increases, the loan supply in the provincial level decreases on average, indicating 
that the loans available for firms have reduced. Given that bank loans are the most important 
source of funding for firms in China (Allen et al., 2005), it is not surprising to see that the 
reduction in loan supply would force firms to adjust their capital structures. 
 
Given that policy uncertainty has a negative impact on the loan supply, it is natural to predict 
that it will increase the price of debt (cost of debt). In this sense, we then test whether EPU 
increases financing costs, with the empirical model as follows: 
 
, 1 ,1 1 ,    3i t i tt i tCost of debt EPU X Quarter Industryα β γ ε− −= + + + + +∑ ∑ （ ）, 
 
where the Cost of debti,t represents the average financing cost from debt for firm i in quarter t. 
Since the interest rate in every loan contract is not available, we instead use the amount of 
interest payment scaled by the total amount of debt in every quarter to proxy for the average 
financing cost; X refers to a set of one quarter lagged control variables, including the leverage 
ratio, firm size, profitability, tangibility, sales revenue and sales growth rate. We also include 
the quarter and industry fixed effects. 
 
The estimation results are reported in Panel B of Table 6. The coefficient of EPU is estimated 
to be 0.066, which is significant at the 1% level. This positive coefficient thus provides 
supportive evidence that policy uncertainty increases firms' financing costs. This finding is 
also consistent with the study of Gao and Qi (2012), who document that political uncertainty 
                                                            
15
 In the Chinese context, it is a reasonable proxy for loan supply as the interest rate has always been regulated 
in the financial markets. The market interest rate is much higher than the regulated one. Therefore, the amount 
of loan mainly represents the supply side effect of debt. 
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is positively associated with firms' public financing costs. Collectively, all the results in Table 
6 show that EPU has deteriorated the external financing environment for Chinese firms, thus 
suggesting that the supply effect helps explain the sensitivity of capital structures towards 
policy uncertainty. 
 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
3.4.3. Impact of EPU on the usage of trade credit 
 
Besides the loans from commercial banks, trade credit is an important informal financing 
channel, especially for firms in developing countries (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Fisman and 
Love, 2003). In the presence of bank discrimination, trade credit has also been widely used 
by Chinese firms as a substitute for bank loans to meet their financing demands (Ge and Qiu, 
2007; Allen et al., 2005)16. As we have documented, policy uncertainty has deteriorated 
firms' external financing environments. Thus, how firms would adjust their financing 
structures is an important and interesting question. In this sense, we are going to examine the 
relationship between EPU and the usage of trade credit with the following specification from 
Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013: 
 
, 1 ,1 1 ,   4i i t ttt iTC EPU X Quarter Industryα β γ ε− −= + + + + +∑ ∑ （ ） 
 
where TCi,t represents one of two measures for the usage for trade credit. First, following 
Fisman and Love (2003), we define TC as the accounts payable scaled by total assets. 
Second, to capture the relative importance of trade credit compared to debt, we construct 
another variable (TC-debt ratio) as 	 
	

; X is a set of lagged control variables, 
including firm size, profitability, tangibility, leverage, sales revenue and sales growth rate. 
We also incorporate the quarter and industry fixed effects. 
 
                                                            
16
 According to the study of Ge and Qiu (2007), compared to state owned firms, non-state owned firms use more 
trade credit, and this higher usage is primarily for financing rather than transactional purposes. 
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As reported in Table 1, the mean value of TC is 8.80%, about 1/6 of the leverage ratio — 
suggesting that the scale of trade credit used by Chinese firms is non-negligible. We present 
the estimation results in Table 7. In the first column, we find that TC is positively associated 
with EPU, indicating that in face of increasing policy uncertainty, firms tend to raise their 
usage of trade credit on average. Further, we also document a positive relationship between 
the TC-debt ratio and EPU in the second column. This result suggests that the weight of trade 
credit in firms’ financing plans increase with policy uncertainty. Overall, our results confirm 
the role of trade credit in financing and suggest that Chinese firms would adjust their capital 
structures in response to economic policy uncertainty. Further, the positive association 
between EPU and the usage of trade credit also provides support for the supply effect instead 
of the demand effect, given that the financing cost for trade credit is usually higher than that 
of bank loans (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). However, due to the higher 
financing cost of trade credit and the fact that, compared to bank loans, trade credit is tied to 
the purchase of goods with less flexibility, the role of trade credit in attenuating the impact of 
EPU on capital structure may still be limited. 
 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
3.5. Robustness checks  
To ensure our results are robust to sample selection bias, outliers and endogeneity issues, we 
conduct several robustness checks in this section. 
 
3.5.1.  Excluding utility firms 
In our sample sele tion, we have excluded the financial firms and the “ST”/ “PT” firms. To 
further clean the sample, we exclude firms from the utility industries. In the Chinese context, 
the utility industries defined in this paper are the hydraulic industry, environmental industry 
and public management industry. We report the baseline regression results in Table 8. The 
results show that the exclusion of the firms from the utility industries has not affected the 
robustness of our results. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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3.5.2. Excluding observations with leverage greater than one 
In our sample, the maximum value of the leverage ratio is 2.877. This is unusually high and 
could be due to an outlier problem 17 . As a robustness check, we drop firm-quarter 
observations if the ratio of book leverage is greater than one, following the approach of Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007). We then re-estimate the baseline 
regression model. From the results presented in Table 9, the conclusion that the EPU 
negatively relates to the leverage ratio remains stable.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
 3.5.3. Controlling for regional fixed effects 
In Section 3.2, we document a strong pattern that indicated that marketization levels of 
different regions would affect the impact of EPU on capital structure decisions. It is possible 
that some unobservable features in the geographic location of the firms would contribute 
significantly to the impact of EPU18. In line with this argument, we conduct a robustness 
check by including the regional fixed effects in the baseline regions. The results reported in 
Table 10 clearly show that including the regional fixed effects has not affected our results 
qualitatively or quantitatively. 
 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
3.5.3. Using annual observations 
In the capital structure literature, the annual sample is more commonly used. Quarterly 
observations may also have seasonality. Due to these considerations, we re-estimate the 
baseline model using an annual sample from 2003 to 2013. The annual EPU is defined as the 
average of four quarterly EPU measures within that year and is lagged one year in the 
estimation. The results presented in Table 11 show that annual EPU relates negatively with 
                                                            
17
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
18
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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the book leverage measures. The coefficients also have larger magnitudes when compared 
with the results in Table 2, which are based on the quarterly observations. 
 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
 
3.5.4. Controlling for endogeneity 
EPU may not be a strictly exogenous variable, but instead be affected by firms’ aggregate 
financing behaviours or common factors that relate to policy uncertainty and leverage 
decisions simultaneously. To address this consideration, following Wang et al. (2014), we use 
the one quarter lagged U.S. EPU as the instrumental variable for the current level of China 
EPU and adopt a two-stage least squares estimation procedure19. The first stage regression 
results in Panel A of Table 11 document a significantly positive relationship between the U.S. 
EPU and China’s EPU. In the second stage, the estimated EPU from the first stage regression 
is still negatively associated with the book leverage ratio — thus mitigating the concern of 
endogeneity.  
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
4. Conclusion 
The determinants of corporate capital structures are an enduringly important question in the 
corporate finance literature. In this paper, using a recently available measure of economic 
policy uncertainty for China, we explore the relationship between EPU and Chinese firms’ 
capital structure choices from 2003 to 2013. We find that leverage ratios are negatively 
associated with EPU on average, and this negative effect is more significant for firms from 
regions with higher marketization indexes, are non-state owned, or have no prior bank-firm 
relationship. We then provide consistent evidence that the negative relationship between 
capital structures and EPU is sourced from the deterioration of the external financing 
environment caused by the EPU. Finally, we show that firms’ usage of trade credit is 
positively related to EPU, suggesting that firms tend to adjust their financing structures as a 
response to economic policy uncertainty. 
                                                            
19 The U.S. EPU is also sourced from www.policyuncertainty.com. 
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The results from this study contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our paper 
provides an “out-of-sample” test for recent studies on the relationship between economic 
policy uncertainty and firm capital structure choices using Chinese data, and we also shed 
new light on this topic by showing that Chinese firms tend to adjust their financing decisions 
between debt and trade credit in the presence of economic policy uncertainty. Second, our 
paper relates to the literature concerning the supply-side factors affecting a firm’s capital 
structure. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) find that firms with public debt market access have 
higher leverage ratios and Cao et al. (2013) document that having public access to debt can 
mitigate the financial constraints imposed by policy uncertainty. In this research, we provide 
consistent evidence that EPU affects firms’ capital structure choices mainly by influencing 
the firms' external financial environments. Finally, this paper also contributes to the growing 
studies examining the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate behaviour. By providing 
evidence about the effect of the EPU index on capital structure decisions for Chinese firms, 
our study suggests an overarching impact of policy uncert inty on financing choices. 
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Figure 1:  Historic behaviour of the EPU (01/1995-12/2013) 
Note:  This figure plots the monthly EPU from January, 1995 to December, 2013. We also plot the time series 
of quarterly GDP growth rate from Quarter 1, 1995 to Quarter 4, 2013. The left Y-axis represents EPU, and the 
right Y-axis represents GDP growth in percentage. The EPU is obtained from www.policyuncertainty.com, and 
the GDP growth data is from the CEIC China Database. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
Note: This table provides the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in this paper. All the variables are 
from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013, except for the bank-firm relation, which is from Quarter 1, 2003 to 
Quarter 4, 2011. All corporate financial variables are winsorized by 0.5% and 99.5%. 
Statistic Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max 
EPU 72,010 1.28 0.672 0.54 1.007 3.232 
Leverage 67,536 0.522 0.304 0.035 0.509 2.877 
Initial Leverage 71,975 0.414 0.242 0.035 0.394 2.877 
Profitability 67,535 0.034 0.054 -0.255 0.027 0.417 
Size 67,543 21.652 1.362 18.289 21.481 27.352 
Tangibility 67,352 19.944 1.698 4.635 19.893 27.23 
Sales 66,427 0.002 0.012 -0.010 0.0004 0.125 
Sales revenue 67,512 0.431 0.441 0.000 0.313 10.015 
Marketization index 66,456 10.511 2.657 0.730 10.840 15.244 
Ownership 59,983 0.387 0.487 0 0 1 
Bank-Firm relation 27,975 0.598 0.490 0 1 1 
TC 66,288 0.088 0.092 0 0.068 5.982 
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Table 2 The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm leverage (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect 
of economic political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample 
period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote 
the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.003** -0.012*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Initial leverage 0.516*** 0.192*** 0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Profitability -1.293*** -0.618*** -0.023*** 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.007) 
Sales revenue 0.027*** 0.0003 -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.0004) 
Size 0.017*** -0.011*** 0.045*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.118*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
△Sales 0.406*** -0.218*** 0.105*** 
 (0.087) (0.051) (0.030) 
Constant -0.050*** 0.385*** -0.504*** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.007) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ √ 
Industry fixed effect √ √ √ 
Observations 62,403 62,391 62,124 
R2 0.275 0.167 0.292 
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.166 0.291 
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Table 3  The impact of marketization on the effect of economic political uncertainty 
(2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the analysis of marketization on the effect of economic political uncertainty on capital 
structures. Marketize are dummy variables based upon 25%, 50% and 75% quantiles of the marketization index 
in every year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to 
Quarter 4, 2013. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  Leverage  
 Low marketization High marketization Various degree of 
marketization 
 ≦Median ﹥Median  
EPU -0.007*** -0.008** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
EPU*Marketize(>p25,≦p50)   0.023*** 
   (0.003) 
EPU*Marketize(>p50,≦p75)   0.017*** 
   (0.003) 
EPU*Marketize(>p75)   0.002 
   (0.003) 
Initial Leverage 0.488*** 0.550*** 0.506*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
Profitability -1.270*** -1.181*** -1.213*** 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.021) 
Sales revenue 0.030*** 0.008* 0.027*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Size 0.030*** 0.005*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.047*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) 
△Sales 0.699*** 0.401*** 0.416*** 
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 (0.109) (0.136) (0.085) 
Constant -0.287*** 0.196*** -0.070*** 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.019) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ √ 
Industry fixed effect √ √ √ 
Observations 35,859 25,512 61,371 
R2 0.256 0.278 0.275 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.278 0.275 
F Statistic 1,232.963*** 378.284*** 751.443*** 
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Table 4 The impact of ownership and bank-firm relationship on the effect of economic 
policy uncertainty   
Note: This table presents the analysis of the impact of ownership and bank-firm relationship on the effect of 
economic policy uncertainty. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period is from 
Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013 for the model using ownership, and is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 
2011 for the model using bank-firm relation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and ***denote the 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage 
EPU -0.024*** -0.023* 
 (0.002) (0.014) 
Ownership*EPU 0.031***  
 (0.003)  
Bank-firm relation*EPU  0.039*** 
  (0.012) 
SOE -0.571***  
 (0.039)  
Bank-firm relation  0.020 
  (0.014) 
Initial Leverage 0.429*** 0.417*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
Profitability -0.949*** -1.057*** 
 (0.030) (0.054) 
Sales revenue -0.042*** 0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Size -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Tangibility 0.177*** 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.016) 
△Sales 0.449*** 0.613 
 (0.117) (0.214) 
Constant 0.379*** 0.394*** 
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 (0.033) (0.053) 
SOE*Controls √  
Bank-firm relation*Controls  √ 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ 
Industry fixed effect √ √ 
Observations 54,819 20,160 
R2 0.280 0.304 
Adjusted R2 0.279 0.303 
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Table 5 Control for investment change rate (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using the subsample controlling for investment 
change rate (Absolute value of change rate of Cap.ex lower than its 25% quintile, between 25% quintile and 
median, and greater than the median). The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and ***denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
        Leverage 
EPU -0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
EPU*∆Cap.ex (≦p25) −0.0001 
   (0.002) 
EPU*∆Cap.ex (>p25,≦p50) 0.001 (0.003) 
Initial Leverage 0.488*** 
 (0.006) 
Profitability -1.307*** 
 (0.021) 
Sales revenue 0.030*** 
 (0.003) 
Size 0.023*** 
 (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.095*** 
 (0.006) 
△Sales 0.509*** 
 (0.086) 
Constant -0.178*** 
∆Cap.ex (≦p25)*Controls √ 
∆Cap.ex (>p25,≦p50)*Controls √ 
Quarter fixed effect √ 
Industry fixed effect √ 
Observations 35,859 
R2 0.299 
Adjusted R2 0.298 
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Table 6  The effect of economic political uncertainty on loan supply and financial cost 
(2003-2013) 
Note: Panel A and B present the estimates of the effect of economic political uncertainty on bank loan supply 
and firm's financing cost, respectively. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Panel A: △Loan             Panel B: Cost of debt 
△EPU -0.016*** -0.016*** EPU 0.066*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.011) 
△Investment 0.0003 0.001 Leverage -0.928*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.032) 
△Deposit 0.055* 0.020 Profitability 0.342* 
 (0.032) (0.032)  (0.176) 
△LR -0.236*** -0.239*** Sales revenue 0.347*** 
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.021) 
△DRR 0.020 0.024 Size -0.025*** 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.006) 
GDP 0.001*** 0.001** Tangibility -0.588*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.046) 
   △Sales 1.059 
    (0.685) 
Constant -0.060* -0.036 Constant 1.204*** 
 (0.032) (0.036)  (0.144) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ Quarter fixed effect √ 
Industry fixed effect  √ Industry fixed effect √ 
Observations 1,152 1,152 Observations 54,370 
R2 0.368 0.393 R2 0.091 
Adjusted R2 0.363 0.372 Adjusted R2 0.090 
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Table 7  The effect of economic political uncertainty on trade credit usage (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the analysis of the effect of economic political uncertainty on firms’ usage of trade 
credit. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 
2013. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 TC TC-debt ratio 
EPU 0.001** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.088*** -0.154*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
Profitability -0.121*** -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.021) 
Sales revenue 0.054*** 0.143*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Size 0.003*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0003) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.041*** -0.248*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
△Sales 0.060** 0.304*** 
 (0.030) (0.083) 
Constant -0.080*** 0.051*** 
 (0.007) (0.018) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ 
Industry fixed effect √ √ 
Observations 62,150 55,809 
R2 0.200 0.202 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.201 
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Table 8  Robustness Check 1: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm 
leverage excluding utility firms (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect 
of economic political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample 
period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Utility firms are excluded. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term  leverage 
EPU -0.004** -0.012*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Initial leverage 0.517*** 0.194*** 0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Profitability -1.346*** -0.632*** -0.053*** 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.007) 
Sales revenue 0.028*** -0.003* -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.0003) 
Size 0.018*** -0.011*** 0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Tangibility 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.114*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
△Sales 0.483*** -0.227*** 0.070*** 
 (0.086) (0.052) (0.031) 
Constant -0.068*** 0.387*** -0.444*** 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ √ 
Industry fixed effect √ √ √ 
Observations 61,474 61,461 61,202 
R2 0.288 0.171 0.287 
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.171 0.286 
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Table 9  Robustness Check 2: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm 
leverage (leverage less than 1) (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect 
of economic political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample 
period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Firms with leverage greater than 1 are excluded. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Initial leverage 0.381*** 0.140*** 0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Profitability -1.080*** -0.538*** -0.069*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) 
Sales revenue 0.034*** -0.002 -0.035*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.047*** -0.003*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Tangibility 0.055*** 0.082*** 0.117*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
△Sales 0.506*** -0.205*** 0.078*** 
 (0.058) (0.044) (0.031) 
Constant -0.655*** 0.234*** -0.457*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ √ 
Industry fixed effect √ √ √ 
Observations 60,250 60,237 59,986 
R2 0.397 0.148 0.296 
Adjusted R2 0.397 0.147 0.296 
 
 
Page 38 of 43
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
36 
 
Table 10 Robustness Check 3: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm 
leverage (with regional fixed effects) (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect 
of economic political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample 
period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. The province fixed effects are used as a robustness check. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.003** -0.011*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Initial leverage 0.492*** 0.183*** 0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Profitability -1.306*** -0.573*** -0.054*** 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.008) 
Sales revenue 0.038*** -0.003* -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Size 0.023*** -0.009*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Tangibility 0.079*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
△Sales 0.470*** -0.207*** 0.053*** 
 (0.082) (0.050) (0.030) 
Constant -0.198*** 0.344*** -0.472*** 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ √ 
Industry fixed effect √ √ √ 
Region fixed effect √ √ √ 
Observations 60,724 60,724 60,517 
R2 0.303 0.172 0.312 
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.172 0.311 
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Table 11 Robustness Check 4: The effect of economic political uncertainty on firm 
leverage using annual data (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using panel regressions. We analyze the effect 
of economic political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample 
period is from 2003 to 2013. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU -0.017** -0.024*** -0.003*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Initial leverage 0.503*** 0.189*** 0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
Profitability -1.531*** -0.708*** -0.059*** 
 (0.042) (0.025) (0.014) 
Sales revenue 0.021*** -0.001 -0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Size 0.017*** -0.010*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.109*** 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.004) 
△Sales 0.897*** -0.014 0.130* 
 (0.221) (0.134) (0.073) 
Constant -0.001 0.379*** -0.452*** 
 (0.038) (0.023) (0.012) 
Industry fixed effect √ √ √ 
Observations 16,049 16,046 15,971 
R2 0.281 0.170 0.292 
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.168 0.291 
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Table 12  Robustness Check 5: Controlling for endogeneity (2003-2013) 
Note: This table presents the estimates from the baseline model using 2-stage regressions. We use the economic 
policy uncertainty index of the U.S. as an IV to perform the first stage. In the second stage, we analyze the effect 
of economic political uncertainty on book leverage, short-term leverage and long-term leverage. The sample 
period is from Quarter 1, 2003 to Quarter 4, 2013. Utility firms are excluded. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *,** and *** denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Panel A: First Stage 
 EPU   
U.S. EPU 0.970***   
 (0.204)   
Constant 0.072   
 (0.254)   
Observations 44   
R2 0.349   
Adjusted R2 0.334   
 Panel B: Second Stage 
 Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage 
EPU (predicted) -0.007** -0.037*** 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Initial leverage 0.517*** 0.191*** 0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Profitability -1.345*** -0.628*** -0.054*** 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.007) 
Sales revenue 0.028*** -0.003* -0.036*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Size 0.018*** -0.009*** 0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Tangibility 0.093*** 0.083*** 0.116*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
△Sales 0.485*** -0.222*** 0.071*** 
 (0.086) (0.052) (0.031) 
Constant -0.068*** 0.391*** -0.445*** 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) 
Quarter fixed effect √ √ √ 
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Industry fixed 
effect √ √ √ 
Observations 61,474 61,461 61,202 
R2 0.288 0.176 0.287 
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.176 0.287 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
EPU Based on the economic political uncertainty index of Baker et al. 
(2013). We transform it into quarterly observations following: 
EPUt= (3EPUIm + 2EPUIm-1 + EPUIm-2)/6. Then divided by 100. 
Annual EPU equals to the average of quarterly EPU. 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total asset. 
Short-term 
leverage 
Short-term debt (≦1year) divided total assets. 
Long-term 
leverage 
Long-term debt (>1year) divided by total assets. 
Marketization 
index 
From Fan et al. (2011). 
SOE Equals 1 when the ultimate owner of the firm is the state and 0 
otherwise. 
Bank-firm 
relation 
Equals 1 if a firm has a long-term bank loan contract in the prior 
year and 0 otherwise. 
Cost of debt Interest cash payment divided by the total amount of debt. 
Sales revenue Operating income divided by total assets. 
Size Log of total assets. 
Initial leverage First observation of the leverage ratio for a firm. For firms listed 
before 2003, it is the first leverage ratio observation from the 
semi-annul financial report, while for firms listed after 2003, it is 
the first leverage ratio observation from the quarterly financial 
report. 
Profitability ROA, measured as net income divided by total assets. 
△Sales logSalest – logSalest-1 
Tangibility Tangible asset after depreciation and depreciation provision 
divided by total assets. 
Cap.ex Capital expenditure divided by the one period lagged total assets. 
Capital expenditure is measured as the sum of cash paid for the 
acquisition of fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term 
assets. 
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△Loan Growth rate of loans in a province. 
△EPU Growth rate of EPU. 
△Investment Growth rate of total investment in a province. 
△Deposit Growth rate of the amount of deposit in a province. 
△LR Growth rate of the loan interest rate. 
△DRR Growth rate of the deposit reserve rate. 
TC Trade credit, measured as the account payable divided by total 
assets. 
TC-debt ratio Account payable divided by the sum of account payable and total 
debt. 
 
 
 
